### 2ac-Case

#### Russian weapons are secure- they have impassable security features and are easily recovered.

Mueller 2008 (John Mueller, pub. date: 1-1-08, Dept. of Political Science Ohio State Univ., “THE ATOMIC TERRORIST: ASSESSING THE LIKELIHOOD,” http://polisci.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller/APSACHGO.PDF)

It might be added that Russia has an intense interest in controlling any weapons on its territory since it is likely to be a prime target of any illicit use by terrorist groups, particularly, of course, Chechen ones with whom it has been waging an vicious on-and-off war for over a decade (Cameron 2004, 84). Officials there insist that all weapons have either been destroyed or are secured, and the experts polled by Linzer (2004) point out that "it would be very difficult for terrorists to figure out on their own how to work a Russian or Pakistan bomb" even if they did obtain one because even the simplest of these "has some security features that would have to be defeated before it could be used" (see also Kamp 1996, 34; Wirz and Egger 2005, 502; Langewiesche 2007, 19). One of the experts, Charles Ferguson, stresses You’d have to run it through a specific sequence of events, including changes in temperature, pressure and environmental conditions before the weapon would allow itself to be armed, for the fuses to fall into place and then for it to allow itself to be fired. You don't get off the shelf, enter a code and have it go off. Moreover, continues Linzer, most bombs that could conceivably be stolen use plutonium which emits a great deal of radiation that could relatively easily be detected by passive sensors at ports and other points of transmission.

#### No chokepoints, construction is fast

Kessides and Kuznetsov 2012 (Ioannis N. Kessides, Development Research Group at The World Bank, and Vladimir Kuznetsov, consultant for The World Bank, July 2012, “Small Modular Reactors for Enhancing Energy Security in Developing Countries,” Sustainability, http://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/4/8/1806/htm)

Reduced construction duration. The smaller size, lower power, and simpler design of SMRs allow for greater modularization, standardization, and factory fabrication of components and modules. Use of factory-fabricated modules simplifies the on-site construction activities and greatly reduces the amount of field work required to assemble the components into an operational plant. As a result, the construction duration of SMRs could be significantly shorter compared to large reactors leading to important economies in the cost of financing.

**YES nukes now- 50 countries- Their ev is a bad snapshot**

**Hussain 2012** (Yadullah Hussain, March 9, 2012, “50 countries developing nuclear energy plans: report,” Financial Post, http://business.financialpost.com/2012/03/09/50-countries-developing-nuclear-energy-plans-report/)

The nuclear-energy industry is recovering from the Fukushima nuclear power plant debacle, with at least **50 countries** building, operating or considering nuclear power as part of their energy mix, according to a study.¶ About half of these countries are newcomers to nuclear, and there are **more than 60** nuclear plants under construction, mainly in China, Russia, India and South Korea, says a report from the World Energy Council.¶ “Apart from the **limited cases** where the Fukushima accident has caused governments to think again, the majority of countries, **after the initial emotion**, are now engaged in a rational assessment of the pros and cons of nuclear to bring energy to their populations,” said Pierre Gadonneix, chairman of the WEC.¶ Meanwhile, U.N. atomic energy chief said on Friday that nuclear power is safer than it was a year ago. In a statement issued ahead of Sunday’s first anniversary of the world’s worst nuclear crisis since Chernobyl in 1986, Director General Yukiya Amano of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) said meaningful steps had been taken to strengthen global nuclear safety since Fukushima.¶ “Nuclear safety is stronger than it was a year ago,” he said. “We know what went wrong and we have a clear course of action to tackle those causes – not only in Japan, but anywhere in the world.”¶ Amano added: “Now we have to keep up the momentum. Complacency can kill.”¶ Still, the implications of the Fukushima disaster remain uncertain, especially after Germany, Switzerland and Belgium decided to move away from nuclear power altogether and build up alternative renewable energy sources instead.¶ “Among the long-term outcomes, may be a general sense that ambivalent or negative views of nuclear energy and, in particular, questions about its safety, were justified This may involve an increase in the so-called “not in my backyard” mentality, with people not wanting facilities/plants in their immediate vicinity or neighbourhood.”¶ The WEC report notes that progress in several national programmes, especially in countries new to nuclear power, has been delayed, especially with regard to near-term decisions to start such projects.¶ OECD countries dominate the market with the largest in the USA (104 reactors), followed by France (58 reactors) and Japan (54 reactors) but most of the nuclear plants under construction are in non-OECD countries. China alone accounted for 42% of the construction (27 reactors), followed by Russia with 17% (11 reactors), and India with 8% (five reactors).¶ Similarly, most of the planned and proposed reactors were also in non-OECD regions. Of the total 159 planned reactors, China accounted for 31% (50 reactors), followed by India 11% (18 reactors), Russia 9% (14 reactors), and Japan 8% (12 reactors). Of the 323 proposed reactors, China accounted for 34% (110), India 12% (40), Russia 9% (30), the USA 7% (23), and Ukraine 6% (20).

#### Their authors are coffeehouse hacks – prefer actions over anti-imperialist intellectualizing

Victor Davis **Hanson** (Ph. D. in Classics, Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University, a Professor Emeritus at California University, Fresno) November 27, **2002** “A Funny Sort of Empire: Are Americans really so imperial?” National Review Online, , http://www.victorhanson.com/articles/hanson112702.html, UK: Fisher

Much, then, of what we read about the evil of American imperialism is written by post-heroic and bored elites, intellectuals, and coffeehouse hacks, whose freedom and security are a given, but whose rarified tastes are apparently unshared and endangered. In contrast, the poorer want freedom and material things first — and cynicism, skepticism, irony, and nihilism second. So we should not listen to what a few say, but rather look at what many do. Critiques of the United States based on class, race, nationality, or taste have all failed to explicate, much less stop, the American cultural juggernaut. Forecasts of bankrupting defense expenditures and imperial overstretch are the stuff of the faculty lounge. Neither Freud nor Marx is of much help. And real knowledge of past empires that might allow judicious analogies is beyond the grasp of popular pundits. Add that all up, and our exasperated critics are left with the same old empty jargon of legions and gunboats.

#### Violence is objectively decreasing due to western liberal democracy-best method to solve conflict

Pinker 11 Steven Pinker is Professor of psychology at Harvard University "Violence Vanquished" Sept 24 online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111904106704576583203589408180.html

 With all its wars, murder and genocide, history might suggest that the taste for blood is human nature. Not so, argues Harvard Prof. Steven Pinker. He talks to WSJ's Gary Rosen about the decline in violence in recent decades and his new book, "The Better Angels of Our Nature." But a better question may be, "How bad was the world in the past?" Believe it or not, the world of the past was much worse. Violence has been in decline for thousands of years, and today we may be living in the most peaceable era in the existence of our species. The decline, to be sure, has not been smooth. It has not brought violence down to zero, and it is not guaranteed to continue. But it is a persistent historical development, visible on scales from millennia to years, from the waging of wars to the spanking of children. This claim, I know, invites skepticism, incredulity, and sometimes anger. We tend to estimate the probability of an event from the ease with which we can recall examples, and scenes of carnage are more likely to be beamed into our homes and burned into our memories than footage of people dying of old age. There will always be enough violent deaths to fill the evening news, so people's impressions of violence will be disconnected from its actual likelihood. Evidence of our bloody history is not hard to find. Consider the genocides in the Old Testament and the crucifixions in the New, the gory mutilations in Shakespeare's tragedies and Grimm's fairy tales, the British monarchs who beheaded their relatives and the American founders who dueled with their rivals. Today the decline in these brutal practices can be quantified. A look at the numbers shows that over the course of our history, humankind has been blessed with six major declines of violence. The first was a process of pacification: the transition from the anarchy of the hunting, gathering and horticultural societies in which our species spent most of its evolutionary history to the first agricultural civilizations, with cities and governments, starting about 5,000 years ago. For centuries, social theorists like Hobbes and Rousseau speculated from their armchairs about what life was like in a "state of nature." Nowadays we can do better. Forensic archeology—a kind of "CSI: Paleolithic"—can estimate rates of violence from the proportion of skeletons in ancient sites with bashed-in skulls, decapitations or arrowheads embedded in bones. And ethnographers can tally the causes of death in tribal peoples that have recently lived outside of state control. These investigations show that, on average, about 15% of people in prestate eras died violently, compared to about 3% of the citizens of the earliest states. Tribal violence commonly subsides when a state or empire imposes control over a territory, leading to the various "paxes" (Romana, Islamica, Brittanica and so on) that are familiar to readers of history. It's not that the first kings had a benevolent interest in the welfare of their citizens. Just as a farmer tries to prevent his livestock from killing one another, so a ruler will try to keep his subjects from cycles of raiding and feuding. From his point of view, such squabbling is a dead loss—forgone opportunities to extract taxes, tributes, soldiers and slaves. The second decline of violence was a civilizing process that is best documented in Europe. Historical records show that between the late Middle Ages and the 20th century, European countries saw a 10- to 50-fold decline in their rates of homicide. The numbers are consistent with narrative histories of the brutality of life in the Middle Ages, when highwaymen made travel a risk to life and limb and dinners were commonly enlivened by dagger attacks. So many people had their noses cut off that medieval medical textbooks speculated about techniques for growing them back. Historians attribute this decline to the consolidation of a patchwork of feudal territories into large kingdoms with centralized authority and an infrastructure of commerce. Criminal justice was nationalized, and zero-sum plunder gave way to positive-sum trade. People increasingly controlled their impulses and sought to cooperate with their neighbors. The third transition, sometimes called the Humanitarian Revolution, took off with the Enlightenment. Governments and churches had long maintained order by punishing nonconformists with mutilation, torture and gruesome forms of execution, such as burning, breaking, disembowelment, impalement and sawing in half. The 18th century saw the widespread abolition of judicial torture, including the famous prohibition of "cruel and unusual punishment" in the eighth amendment of the U.S. Constitution. At the same time, many nations began to whittle down their list of capital crimes from the hundreds (including poaching, sodomy, witchcraft and counterfeiting) to just murder and treason. And a growing wave of countries abolished blood sports, dueling, witchhunts, religious persecution, absolute despotism and slavery. The fourth major transition is the respite from major interstate war that we have seen since the end of World War II. Historians sometimes refer to it as the Long Peace. Today we take it for granted that Italy and Austria will not come to blows, nor will Britain and Russia. But centuries ago, the great powers were almost always at war, and until quite recently, Western European countries tended to initiate two or three new wars every year. The cliché that the 20th century was "the most violent in history" ignores the second half of the century (and may not even be true of the first half, if one calculates violent deaths as a proportion of the world's population). Though it's tempting to attribute the Long Peace to nuclear deterrence, non-nuclear developed states have stopped fighting each other as well. Political scientists point instead to the growth of democracy, trade and international organizations—all of which, the statistical evidence shows, reduce the likelihood of conflict. They also credit the rising valuation of human life over national grandeur—a hard-won lesson of two world wars. The fifth trend, which I call the New Peace, involves war in the world as a whole, including developing nations. Since 1946, several organizations have tracked the number of armed conflicts and their human toll world-wide. The bad news is that for several decades, the decline of interstate wars was accompanied by a bulge of civil wars, as newly independent countries were led by inept governments, challenged by insurgencies and armed by the cold war superpowers. The less bad news is that civil wars tend to kill far fewer people than wars between states. And the best news is that, since the peak of the cold war in the 1970s and '80s, organized conflicts of all kinds—civil wars, genocides, repression by autocratic governments, terrorist attacks—have declined throughout the world, and their death tolls have declined even more precipitously. The rate of documented direct deaths from political violence (war, terrorism, genocide and warlord militias) in the past decade is an unprecedented few hundredths of a percentage point. Even if we multiplied that rate to account for unrecorded deaths and the victims of war-caused disease and famine, it would not exceed 1%. The most immediate cause of this New Peace was the demise of communism, which ended the proxy wars in the developing world stoked by the superpowers and also discredited genocidal ideologies that had justified the sacrifice of vast numbers of eggs to make a utopian omelet. Another contributor was the expansion of international peacekeeping forces, which really do keep the peace—not always, but far more often than when adversaries are left to fight to the bitter end. Finally, the postwar era has seen a cascade of "rights revolutions"—a growing revulsion against aggression on smaller scales. In the developed world, the civil rights movement obliterated lynchings and lethal pogroms, and the women's-rights movement has helped to shrink the incidence of rape and the beating and killing of wives and girlfriends. In recent decades, the movement for children's rights has significantly reduced rates of spanking, bullying, paddling in schools, and physical and sexual abuse. And the campaign for gay rights has forced governments in the developed world to repeal laws criminalizing homosexuality and has had some success in reducing hate crimes against gay people. \* \* \* \* Why has violence declined so dramatically for so long? Is it because violence has literally been bred out of us, leaving us more peaceful by nature? This seems unlikely. Evolution has a speed limit measured in generations, and many of these declines have unfolded over decades or even years. Toddlers continue to kick, bite and hit; little boys continue to play-fight; people of all ages continue to snipe and bicker, and most of them continue to harbor violent fantasies and to enjoy violent entertainment. It's more likely that human nature has always comprised inclinations toward violence and inclinations that counteract them—such as self-control, empathy, fairness and reason—what Abraham Lincoln called "the better angels of our nature." Violence has declined because historical circumstances have increasingly favored our better angels. The most obvious of these pacifying forces has been the state, with its monopoly on the legitimate use of force. A disinterested judiciary and police can defuse the temptation of exploitative attack, inhibit the impulse for revenge and circumvent the self-serving biases that make all parties to a dispute believe that they are on the side of the angels. We see evidence of the pacifying effects of government in the way that rates of killing declined following the expansion and consolidation of states in tribal societies and in medieval Europe. And we can watch the movie in reverse when violence erupts in zones of anarchy, such as the Wild West, failed states and neighborhoods controlled by mafias and street gangs, who can't call 911 or file a lawsuit to resolve their disputes but have to administer their own rough justice. Another pacifying force has been commerce, a game in which everybody can win. As technological progress allows the exchange of goods and ideas over longer distances and among larger groups of trading partners, other people become more valuable alive than dead. They switch from being targets of demonization and dehumanization to potential partners in reciprocal altruism. For example, though the relationship today between America and China is far from warm, we are unlikely to declare war on them or vice versa. Morality aside, they make too much of our stuff, and we owe them too much money. A third peacemaker has been cosmopolitanism—the expansion of people's parochial little worlds through literacy, mobility, education, science, history, journalism and mass media. These forms of virtual reality can prompt people to take the perspective of people unlike themselves and to expand their circle of sympathy to embrace them. These technologies have also powered an expansion of rationality and objectivity in human affairs. People are now less likely to privilege their own interests over those of others. They reflect more on the way they live and consider how they could be better off. Violence is often reframed as a problem to be solved rather than as a contest to be won. We devote ever more of our brainpower to guiding our better angels. It is probably no coincidence that the Humanitarian Revolution came on the heels of the Age of Reason and the Enlightenment, that the Long Peace and rights revolutions coincided with the electronic global village.

### 2ac-Heidegger

#### Case outweighs- Acting to avoid nuclear war comes before Heidegger’s insights

Santoni 1985 Ronald E. Santoni (Phil. Prof @ Denison) 1985, Nuclear War, ed. Fox and Groarke, p. 156-7

To be sure, Fox sees the need for our undergoing “certain fundamental changes” in our “thinking, beliefs, attitudes, values” and Zimmerman calls for a “paradigm shift” in our thinking about ourselves, other, and the Earth. But it is not clear that what either offers as suggestions for what we can, must, or should do in the face of a runaway arms race are sufficient to “wind down” the arms race before it leads to omnicide. In spite of the importance of Fox’s analysis and reminders it is not clear that “admitting our (nuclear) fear and anxiety” to ourselves and “identifying the mechanisms that dull or mask our emotional and other responses” represent much more than examples of basic, often. stated principles of psychotherapy. Being aware of the psychological maneuvers that keep us numb to nuclear reality may well be the road to transcending them but it must only be a “first step” (as Fox acknowledges), during which we Simultaneously act to eliminate nuclear threats, break our complicity with the ams race, get rid of arsenals of genocidal weaponry, and create conditions for international goodwill, mutual trust, and creative interdependence. Similarly, in respect to Zimmerman: in spite of the challenging Heideggerian insights he brings out regarding what motivates the arms race, many questions may be raised about his prescribed “solutions.” Given our need for a paradigm shift in our (distorted) understanding of ourselves and the rest of being, are we merely left “to prepare for a possible shift in our self-understanding? (italics mine)? Is this all we can do? Is it necessarily the case that such a shift “cannot come as a result of our own will?” – and work – but only from “a destiny outside our control?” Does this mean we leave to God the matter of bringing about a paradigm shift? Granted our fears and the importance of not being controlled by fears, as well as our “anthropocentric leanings,” should we be as cautious as Zimmerman suggests about out disposition “to want to do something” or “to act decisively in the face of the current threat?” In spite of the importance of our taking on the anxiety of our finitude and our present limitation, does it follow that “we should be willing for the worst (i.e. an all-out nuclear war) to occur”? Zimmerman wrongly, I contend, equates “resistance” with “denial” when he says that “as long as we resist and deny the possibility of nuclear war, that possibility will persist and grow stronger.” He also wrongly perceives “resistance” as presupposing a clinging to the “order of things that now prevails.” Resistance connotes opposing, and striving to defeat a prevailing state of affairs that would allow or encourage the “worst to occur.” I submit, against Zimmerman, that we should not, in any sense, be willing for nuclear war or omnicide to occur. (This is not to suggest that we should be numb to the possibility of its occurrence.) Despite Zimmerman’s elaborations and refinements his Heideggerian notion of “letting beings be” continues to be too permissive in this regard. In my judgment, an individual’s decision not to act against and resist his or her government’s preparations for nuclear holocaust is, as I have argued elsewhere, to be an early accomplice to the most horrendous crime against life imaginable – its annihilation. The Nuremburg tradition calls not only for a new way of thinking, a “new internationalism” in which we all become co-nurturers of the whole planet, but for resolute actions that will sever our complicity with nuclear criminality and the genocidal arms race, and work to achieve a future which we can no longer assume. We must not only “come face to face with the unthinkable in image and thought” (Fox) but must act now - with a “new consciousness” and conscience - to prevent the unthinkable, by cleansing the earth of nuclear weaponry. Only when that is achieved wll ultimate violence be removed as the final arbiter of our planet’s fate.

#### Ontology focus at the expense of action causes paralysis

McClean 2001 David McClean (philosopher, writer and business consultant, conducted graduate work in philosophy at NYU) 2001 “The cultural left and the limits of social hope” http://www.american-philosophy.org/archives/past\_conference\_programs/pc2001/Discussion%20papers/david\_mcclean.htm

There is a lot of philosophical prose on the general subject of social justice. Some of this is quite good, and some of it is quite bad. What distinguishes the good from the bad is not merely the level of erudition. Displays of high erudition are gratuitously reflected in much of the writing by those, for example, still clinging to Marxian ontology and is often just a useful smokescreen which shrouds a near total disconnect from empirical reality. This kind of political writing likes to make a lot of references to other obscure, jargon-laden essays and tedious books written by other true believers - the crowd that takes the fusion of Marxian and Freudian private fantasies seriously. Nor is it the lack of scholarship that makes this prose bad. Much of it is well "supported" by footnotes referencing a lode of other works, some of which are actually quite good. Rather, what makes this prose bad is its utter lack of relevance to extant and critical policy debates, the passage of actual laws, and the amendment of existing regulations that might actually do some good for someone else. The writers of this bad prose are too interested in our arrival at some social place wherein we will finally emerge from our "inauthentic" state into something called "reality." Most of this stuff, of course, comes from those steeped in the Continental tradition (particularly post-Kant). While that tradition has much to offer and has helped shape my own philosophical sensibilities, it is anything but useful when it comes to truly relevant philosophical analysis, and no self-respecting Pragmatist can really take seriously the strong poetry of formations like "authenticity looming on the ever remote horizons of fetishization." What Pragmatists see instead is the hope that we can fix some of the social ills that face us if we treat policy and reform as more important than Spirit and Utopia.

#### Correlationist heideggerean logic fails—can never achieve holisitic understanding of being as manifested in objects

Scott C. Richmond is Assistant Professor in Film and Media Studies at the Department of English at Wayne State University. Postmodern Culture > Volume 21, Number 1, September 2010 “Thought, Untethered. A review essay.” (Project Muse)

For Harman, the tool—any given object—is enmeshed in a set of total relations (i.e. the world). Meanwhile, each object is visible only very partially from any given perspective. "The bridge has a completely different reality for every entity it encounters: it is utterly distinct for the seagull, the idle walker, and those who may be driving across it toward a game or a funeral" (TSR 25). The word utterly here is doing a great deal of work: the claim is that the relation between the seagull and the bridge is of a radically different, wholly unrelated, kind than the relation between the idle walker and the bridge. This allows Harman to claim that "there is an absolute gulf between Heidegger's readiness-to-hand and presence-at-hand" (TSR 26). No matter how it manifests itself, the bridge (or any other object) itself is always infinitely withdrawn. Any relation a walker, a seagull, or a driver in a car may have to it always radically misses what the bridge is, in itself. And any relation, in any modality, we may have with a tool, whether it be practical or contemplative, aesthetic or empirical, also always radically misses the object. Harman's object-orientation entails a concern with the "unchecked fury" of the withdrawn essence of objects (TSR 26). Doing justice to the object itself means affirming such fury, and also affirming that we never reach any object as it is in itself. But crucially, neither does any other object: objects are withdrawn from each other as radically as they are from us. The relation (or non-relation) between bolts and pylons is of exactly the same kind as between humans and the bridge: "all relations are on the same footing" (TSR 202). What's refreshing about Harman is his insistence that bolts and pylons deserve as much or more attention from philosophers as the typical objects of philosophy: language, knowledge, mind, etc.

#### Heidegger uses non-falsifiabile methods and jargon to insulate his work from testing

Dumain 2003 Ralph Dumain (Librarian-Archivist-Information Specialist Researcher-Scholar) 2003 “Heidegger’s Jargon” http://www.autodidactproject.org/my/jargon.html

Bourdieu's book was quite fascinating, in that he focused on Heidegger's terminology from the perspective of its covert dual functioning, within the demarcated field of "philosophy" and in the common ideological parlance of the day. Heidegger sought to insulate his work from mere empirical criticism or reference, always removing it to a plane of esoterism removed from profane everyday understanding. Yet his success with the German intelligentsia was bolstered by the resonances of his terminology with the reactionary ideological usages of his words in common parlance. Heidegger's coded language, despite hieratic pretensions, is what makes his ontology political through and through, regardless of his actual affiliation with the Nazi party. Bourdieu calls into question Heidegger's whole method, especially its way of insulating itself from any criticism or even rational evaluation, but also its pretension to greater insight (why should Heidegger's conceptions of seemingly ordinary concepts be any more profound than their ordinary senses?). Bourdieu's approach is based on his sociological concept of the "field". Adorno does not work on the same basis, though he invokes the concept of division of labor to explain the philosophical specialist's proclivities. Adorno finds similar self-protective measures in Heidegger's work as Bourdieu does. Adorno is concerned about the debasement of language—jargon—its emptiness of real content, now filled by catch phrases of indefinite meaning which serve a duplicitous ideological function, in the manner of advertising slogans. Though Heidegger wanted to insulate his nostalgic retreat to Being (sentimentalizing pre-industrial rural life in the process) the vulgar everyday world of the "They", his vacuous ideas are of the very essence of capitalist exchange value. There is a fundamental paradox in trying to maintain the ethos of the mythic in a demythologized world. Heidegger attempts to insulate himself in advance by proving that his would-be interpreters must of necessity misunderstand him, but Adorno finds him out. The most difficult aspect of reading Adorno's book is his references to German discourse of the time (presumably the early '60s). He refers to the abuse of language in everyday political and social discourse and the resonance of same in Heidegger's work, but without acquaintance of the former I get only a nebulous picture of what Adorno's allusions mean. Furthermore, I do not know the dominant intellectual or specifically philosophical trends of the time, though it appears as if German existentialism is still dominant or at least prevalent. Adorno dissects Heidegger's rural phoniness and use of keywords and concepts such as commitment, curiosity, idle chatter, dignity, and death. Adorno intensively analyzes the relation between wholeness and death (involving also the "they" and exchange), finding therein the sour fascist violence at the root of Heidegger's entire philosophy. Adorno's quotations from Heidegger reveal the fraudulent, empty claims of Heidegger's jargon. The only philosopher who comes off looking worse is Jaspers. A comparison between Adorno and Georg Lukacs is also in order. Lukacs’ The Destruction of Reason has a main theme the bogus notion of intellectual intuition, which gets its big boost historically from Schelling. My guess then is that Lukacs' critique would go right to the main ontological and epistemological issues of subjective idealism. While the argumentative basis between Lukacs and Adorno in aesthetics is well documented (I believe the most relevant documents are collected in Aesthetics and Politics), I am only aware of a couple of sentences Adorno wrote on Lukacs' Lukacs’ The Destruction of Reason. Adorno asserts that this book only amounts to evidence of the destruction of Lukacs' own reason. Also, that Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, etc. were in their own way protesting against reification. I find this extremely lame, pathetic really. Did Adorno write anything else on Lukacs' book? And, as I've asked several times, is there any secondary literature that seriously compares the critiques of Kierkegaard, Heidegger, Husserl, etc., on the part of Lukacs and Adorno, respectively? (Written 21 April 2003) Adorno on Heidegger, Authenticity & Authority I think I know what Adorno is getting with respect to ‘absolute authority’, but the point should be clarified. It's important and therefore we should guard against misinterpretation. I take Adorno to contrast the new subjectivism with the old absolute idealism. The metaphysical assertions of yore are overthrown—i.e. the authority of the absolute—but what replaces them? A philosophy claiming to represent real being and experience over abstraction, but with indefinite reference and content. Adorno then wants to show how the Heideggerian template does not promote authentic experience at all, but rather an ideology of power against which there is no appeal because there is no determinate intellectual content to support or oppose. Hence there is no ideal order to confirm or oppose, but a mere subjective stance, which absolutizes authority as a power principle while destroying it as an intellectual principle. And this is just what Nazism did. The paradox is that Nazism was so opportunistic that, apart from its racial theory, it never established or accepted any official philosophy! Neither Heidegger nor his rivals succeeded in getting the Nazis to endorse their philosophies. If Adorno means anything like what I think he does, I would say his observation is very profound. As for Adorno's objection to the authentic self, let's hope this was not motivated by the same animus that set him against Fromm. Either way, Adorno is certainly correct to point out how the jargon of authenticity serves as an ideological mask, first of all for Heidegger himself, whose authenticity ended up as the führerprinzip. Heidegger was a scumbag through and through, and the fact that people like Marcuse or Sartre could be taken in to the extent that they were screams volumes about the bankruptcy of bourgeois European civilization and its intellectuals.

#### Disavowal of subjectivity as the basis for individual experience of being is a nihilistic abdication of life’s potential to affect change

Caputo 74 (Meister Eckhart and the Later Heidegger: The Mystical Element in Heidegger's Thought: Part One Caputo, John D. Journal of the History of Philosophy, Volume 12, Number 4, October 1974, pp. 479-494 (Article) Published by The Johns Hopkins University Press DOI: 10.1353/hph.2008.0792; project muse)

I. HEIDEGGER AND MEDIEVAL MYSTICISM In the "Introduction" to his habilitation dissertation at Freiburg, The Doctrine 01 Categories and of Meaning in Duns Scotus (1916), the young Heidegger praised the "objective" orientation of medieval philosophy: "Scholastic psychology, precisely inasmuch as it is not focussed upon the dynamic and flowing reality of the psychical remains in its fundamental problems oriented towards the objective and noematic, a circumstance which greatly favors setting one's sight on the phenomenon of intentionality" (DS, 15). 1 While modern philosophy is characterized by a keen sense of subjective experience, the Scholastic thinker is concerned primarily with the object of knowledge, with "being." The Scholastic, he says, is typified by an "absolute surrender" to the "content" of knowledge (DS, 7). In a sentence which is prophetic in the light of what he would later call the "subject matter of thinking" (die Sache des Denkens) Heidegger observes: "The value of the subject matter [Sache] (object) dominates over the value of the self (subject)" (DS, 7). Because thinking "tends into" (intendere) being, the medievals spoke of the "intentional" character of knowledge. Thus the Scholastics' neglect of subjective experience at least kept them free of the "unphilosophy of psychologism" (DS, 14). Heidegger found in the medievals an anticipation of the work of Husserl, who would come to Freiburg this same year (1916) and whose Logical Investigations he had been studying for some time (SD, 82). Both Husserl and the author of De modis significandf 2 reject the reduction of the laws of logic to the empirical constitution of the human mind; both seek a "pure" grammar which delineates unchanging relationships between the parts of speech and which holds true a priori of every possible empirical language (DS, 149-150). The simple but challenging task for thinking in the medieval world was to subordinate the "individuality of the individual" (DS, 7) to the demands of the subject matter, to its unchanging structures and "objective meanings." That is why one can read through the great Summae of the thirteenth century without once catching a glimpse of the personalities of their authors. But it would be a mistake, Heidegger contends, to think that behind the objectivity and formalism of the Scholastic there is nothing "living." On the contrary, "the theoretical posture of the spirit is only one" of its possible attitudes and perhaps not even the most important (DS, 236). Hence the text we cited above continues: In order to reach a decisive insight into this fundamental character of scholastic psychology, I consider a philosophical, or more exactly, a phenomenological examination of the mystical, moral theological and ascetical literature of medieval scholasticism to be especially urgent. In such a way alone will one push forward to what is living in the life of medieval scholasticism . . . . (DS, 15) Behind the impersonal disputations of the scholastics there is the life of the soul which seeks God in the practice of morality and asceticism. The speculative theology and philosophy of the Middle Ages is not opposed to its mystical tradition but rather expresses in a conceptual way what the mystic has experienced: If one reflects on the deeper essence of philosophy in its character as a philosophy of world-views, then the conception of the Christian philosophy of the Middle Ages as a scholasticism which stands in opposition to the contemporaneous mysticism must be exposed as fundamentally wrong. In the medieval world-view, scholasticism and mysticism belong essentially together. The two pairs of "opposites" rationalism-irrationalism and scholasticism-mysticism do not coincide. And where their equivalence is sought, it rests on an extreme rationalization of philosophy. Philosophy as a rationalist creation, detached from life, is powerless; mysticism as an irrationalist experience is purposeless. (DS 241) Philosophy is the conceptualization of what the living historical man experiences. And for the young Heidegger, the experience of the mystic is the experience of medieval man intensified and "writ large."

\*I don’t think we endorse the gendered language in this evidence.

#### The alternative can’t solve – it gets rolled back.

George Kateb, 1997, William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Politics, Emeritus, at Princeton University, “Technology and Society,” Social research Vol. 64 Issue 3

But the question arises as to where a genuine principle of limitation on technological endeavor would come from. It is scarcely conceivable that Western humanity – and by now most of humanity , because of their pleasures and interests and theor won passions and desires and motives – would halt the technological project. Even if, by some change of heart, Western humanity could adopt an alterned relation to reality and human beings, how could it be enforced and allowed to yield its effects? The technological project can only be stopped by some global catastrophe that it had helped or cause or was powerless to avoid. Heidegger’s teasing invocation of the idea that a saving remedy grows with the worst danger is useless. In any case, no one would want the technological project halted, if the only way was a global catastrophe. Perhaps even the survivors would not want to block it reemergence.

#### No root cause of war – focus on the particulars instead

Gat 9 [Azar, Chair of the Department of Political Science at Tel Aviv University, So Why Do People Fight? Evolutionary Theory and the Causes of War, European Journal of International Relations, 2009, Vol. 15(4): 571–599, http://ejt.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/15/4/571]

This article’s contribution is two-pronged: it argues that IR theory regarding the causes of conflict and war is deeply flawed, locked for decades in ultimately futile debates over narrow, misconstrued concepts; this conceptual confusion is untangled and the debate is transcended once a broader, comprehensive, and evolutionarily informed perspective is adopted. Thus attempts to find the root cause of war in the nature of either the individual, the state, or the international system are fundamentally misplaced. In all these ‘levels’ there are necessary but not sufficient causes for war, and the whole cannot be broken into pieces.13 People’s needs and desires — which may be pursued violently — as well as the resulting quest for power and the state of mutual apprehension which fuel the security dilemma are all molded in human nature (some of them existing only as options, potentials, and skills in a behavioral ‘tool kit’); they are so molded because of strong evolutionary pressures that have shaped humans in their struggle for survival over geological times, when all the above literally constituted matters of life and death. The violent option of human competition has been largely curbed within states, yet is occasionally taken up on a large scale between states because of the anarchic nature of the inter-state system. However, returning to step one, international anarchy in and of itself would not be an explanation for war were it not for the potential for violence in a fundamental state of competition over scarce resources that is imbedded in reality and, consequently, in human nature. The necessary and sufficient causes of war — that obviously have to be filled with the particulars of the case in any specific war — are thus as follows: politically organized actors that operate in an environment where no superior authority effectively monopolizes power resort to violence when they assess it to be their most cost-effective option for winning and/or defending evolution-shaped objects of desire, and/or their power in the system that can help them win and/or defend those desired goods. Wars have been fought for the attainment of the same objects of human desire that underlie the human motivational system in general — only by violent means, through the use of force. Politics — internal and external — of which war is, famously, a continuation, is the activity intended to achieve at the intra- and inter-state ‘levels’ the very same evolution-shaped human aims we have already seen. Some writers have felt that ‘politics’ does not fully encompass the causes of war. Even Thayer (2004: 178–9), who correctly argues that evolutionary theory explains ultimate human aims, nonetheless goes on to say, inconsistently, that Clausewitz needs extension because war is caused not only by political reasons but also by the evolutionarily rooted search for resources, as if the two were separate, with politics being somehow different and apart, falling outside of the evolutionary logic. What is defined as ‘politics’ is of course a matter of semantics, and like all definitions is largely arbitrary. Yet, as has been claimed here, if not attributed to divine design, organisms’ immensely complex mechanisms and the behavioral propensities that emanate from them — including those of human beings — ultimately could only have been ‘engineered’ through evolution. The challenge is to lay out how evolution-shaped human desires relate to one another in motivating war. The desire and struggle for scarce resources — wealth of all sorts — have always been regarded as a prime aim of ‘politics’ and an obvious motive for war. They seem to require little further elaboration. By contrast, reproduction does not appear to figure as a direct motive for war in large-scale societies. However, as we saw, appearance is often deceptive, for somatic and reproductive motives are the two inseparable sides of the same coin. In modern societies, too, sexual adventure remained central to individual motivation in going to war, even if it usually failed to be registered at the level of ‘state politics.’ This may be demonstrated by the effects of the sexual revolution since the 1960s, which, by lessening the attraction of foreign adventure for recruits and far increasing the attraction of staying at home, may have contributed to advanced societies’ growing aversion to war. Honor, status, glory, and dominance — both individual and collective — enhanced access to somatic and reproductive success and were thus hotly pursued and defended, even by force. The security dilemma sprang from this state of actual and potential competition, in turn pouring more oil onto its fire. Power has been the universal currency through which all of the above could be obtained and/or defended, and has been sought after as such, in an often escalating spiral. Kinship — expanding from family and tribe to peoples — has always exerted overwhelming influence in determining one’s loyalty and willingness to sacrifice in the defense and promotion of a common good. Shared culture is a major attribute of ethnic communities, in the defense of which people can be invested as heavily as in the community’s political independence and overall prosperity. Finally, religious and secular ideologies have been capable of stirring enormous zeal and violence; for grand questions of cosmic and socio-political order have been perceived as possessing paramount practical significance for securing and promoting life on earth and/or in the afterlife. In the human problem-solving menus, ideologies function as the most general blueprints. Rather than comprising a ‘laundry list’ of causes for war, all of the above partake in the interconnected human motivational system, originally shaped by the calculus of survival and reproduction.

#### Heidegger’s kritik, creates a jargon of authenticity – this mythical language refers not to historical, actual structures of oppression, but only to ideal linguistic concepts – it masks political and social structures of violence and makes oppression inevitable

Trent **Schroyer** (Professor of Sociology-Philosophy in the School of Social Science and Human Services at Ramapo College) **1973** “The Jargon of Authenticity” p. xiii-xvi

In The Jargon of Authenticity **Adorno** applies the method of immanent criticism to **comtemporary German existentialists** (e.g., Buber, Jaspers, Heidegger, etc.). His basic thesis is that **after World War II** this philosophical perspective became an ideological mystification of human domination – while pretending to be a critique of anlienation. Use of existentialistic terms became, Adorno argues, a jargon: a mode of magical expression which Walter Benjamin called an “aura.” In the aura of existentialism **the historical need for meaning and liberation was expressed, but in a way that mystified the actual relation between language and its objective content.** Adorno’s critique focuses on the jargon’s incapacity to express the relation between language and truth**, in that it breaks the dialectic of language** by making the intended object appear present by the idealization inherent in the word itself. **The jargon**, therefore, **falls into an objectivism that conceals the difference between philosophical reflection and the in-itselfness of the object of reflection.** Such objectivism loses the intent of reflection to maintain a self-consciousness of the mediation of fact through the thinking subject. Consequently, **in the jargon** objective consciousness is compressed into self-experience, and an idealism results. But the societal result of this idealistic tendency is that the jargon shares with modern advertising the ideological circularity of pretending to make present, in pure expressivity, an idealized for that is devoid of content; or, alternatively, just as the **mass** media can create a presence whose aura makes the spectator seem to experience a nonexistent actuality, so the jargon presents a gesture of autonomy without content. Adorno’s analysis here continues Marx’s analysis of the fetishism of commodities, in that the symbolisms of the jargon do not represent actual social relations but rather symbolize only the relations between abstract concepts. Lost in the fetishisms of the jargon is the actuality of the hisotircal development of human consciousness. That the subject itself is formed, and deformed, by the objective configuration of institutions is forgotten and thus reified, in the jargon’s pathos of archaic primalness. Consequently, **there is a loss of the objective context of human society and an idealistic compression of all historical consciousness into the sphere of self-experience**. For example, Adorno cites Martin Buber’s I and Thou and Paul Tillich’s stress and religiosity is an end in itself, as instances of the shift to subjectivity as an in-it-selfness. In both cases, the words are referred to the immediacy of life, to attidudinal and qualitative aspects of self-experience. One needs onlyto be a believer; the objective content of belief has been eclipsed in the subjectiviation of objective content. To be a Christian seems to be a personal question – independent from the historical divinity of Christ. **Without necessarily intending to do so,** this **extreme subjectivity** transforms existentialistic language into a mystification of the objective constraints that block the autonomy **and spontaneity of the historical subject.**

### 1ar-heidegger

#### speculative realism resolves the blindspots of anti-foundational logic—engaging in this predictive foresight results in better understanding

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Installing aesthetics as the model for the relation between thought and world would seem to obviate the problem of the correlationist circle (or that's what's in the offing), since as Shaviro would have it, the kind of resonance at issue between thought and world on this model would not name a special form of relation between a subject and an object, but all forms of relatedness between entities. Moreover, this model introduces something like a kernel or splinter of the absolute into every relation of thought and object (or, for that matter, any object with any other). It stages, in miniature, in every encounter between a thought and an object, the kind of move Meillassoux makes at the level of ontology. No appeal to any aspect of the appearance of an object will ever be able, in the last instance, to found any claim about that object whatsoever, as it is in itself. Yet such a claim is not groundless, or irrational: you can always give reasons. (Although eventually, you can only just point or gesture: don't you just see it?) And yet, since there is something fundamentally unaccountable in such a relation, it includes an appeal to something absolute—it is asserted, universally, without being subsumed under a concept. This very well may look like an attempt to square the correlationist circle even while claiming to be outside it, reprising "postmodern skepticism" by denying that thought ever really grasps its object, staying comfortably within the navel-gazing domain of human culture, all while making rather extravagant appeals to first philosophy and metaphysics. By the same token, speculative realism, from certain angles, takes on an aspect of remarkable hubris, even megalomania, even as it claims to get us beyond self-involved anthropocentrism. Or I may seem to be attempting an accommodationist compromise by articulating a position in critical and cultural theory that isn't undermined by the critiques of correlationism that found speculative realist philosophy, and from which seemingly antagonistic arguments about first philosophy, ontology, and metaphysics seem not just relevant but urgent. It's possible that I am. In any event, my goal is to articulate a way in which speculative realism can pose a productive challenge to critical and cultural theory. Whatever the solution or resolution, its challenge consists in thinking in new and radical ways the importance, stakes, and force of speculative thinking within critical thought about art, literature, and culture. At a time like this, with the defunding or outright dissolution of institutional spaces dedicated to the practice of speculation, we need more and better ways to say how and why thought matters.